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The Pickup of Nonspecifying
Variables Does Not Entail
Indirect Perception
Rob Withagen
Institute for Fundamental and Clinical Movement Sciences
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
A number of recent empirical studies revealed the pickup of nonspecifying variables.
This raises the question of whether perception is sometimes indirect. In this article this
question is addressed and answered in the negative. First, it is argued that empirical
studies are likely to reveal that animals also rely on nonspecifying variables. Probably
not every meaningful environmental property is specified by an informational variable.
Furthermore, from an evolutionary perspective there is reason to believe that animals
also attend to nonspecifying variables, even if specifying information exists. Second, it
is argued that the pickup of nonspecifying variables does not entail indirect perception.
Gibson’s (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) conception of perception as a direct epistemic con-
tact with the environment is adopted. It is suggested that this epistemic contact can be
thought of as a continuum—the contact can differ in degree. The strength of the con-
tact is determined by the informational variable exploited. In this framework, the ani-
mal is in direct epistemic contact with an environmental property, regardless of
whether a specifying or nonspecifying variable is exploited.
One of Gibson’s (1966, 1979/1986) major contributions to psychology was his di-
rect perception theory. This perception theory is probably best known for its claim
on the nature of the informational variables that animals pick up. At the time Gib-
son developed his perception theory, it was widely accepted that perceptual sys-
tems receive impoverished stimulus information that relates ambiguously to envi-
ronmental properties (see, e.g., Reed, 1988). Gibson (1959, 1966, 1979/1986)
opposed this theory. He asserted that the stimulus information available to the ani-
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mal is rich, not impoverished. According to the common interpretation, his theory
holds that the informational variables that the animal picks up are “uniquely and
invariantly tied to their sources in the environment” (Michaels & Carello, 1981, p.
19). That is, the exploited informational variables are not ambiguous with respect
to environmental properties; rather, they are specific to them—they relate
one-to-one to environmental properties. “The specification is sought in invariants,
patterns of stimulation over time and/or space that are left unchanged by certain
transformations” (Michaels & Carello, pp. 19–20). And by picking up such invari-
ant, specifying patterns, the animal directly perceives the environmental property
that the exploited invariant specifies.
Gibson’s (1966, 1979/1986) direct perception theory has yielded a fruitful experi-
mental program. According to many proponents of the theory (see, e.g., Turvey,
1990; Turvey & Carello, 1995), “Two major experimental goals within Gibson’s pro-
gramare todiscover specificity (1)betweenpropertiesof thestructuredenergydistri-
butions and properties of the environment, body, and environment–body relations
and (2) between perception and properties of structured energy distributions” (Tur-
vey & Carello, 1995, pp. 482–483).
The search for such specificity relations has yielded some interesting discover-
ies. First, informational variables that are specific to particular environmental
properties have been discovered. The optical variable tau, which specifies time to
contact of an approaching object (given certain constraints), is one well-known
example (e.g., Lee, 1976). Hence, contrary to the assumption of most perception
theories, there exists information that specifies certain properties of the environ-
ment. Second, a number of studies revealed that animals indeed exploit such speci-
fying information (e.g., Savelsbergh, Whiting, & Bootsma, 1991).
However, the pickup of specifying variables has not always been found. A number
of recentecologicallymotivatedexperimental studieshaverevealedthepickupof in-
formational variables that relate ambiguously to the to-be-perceived environmental
feature.Therelianceonsuchnonspecifyingvariableshasbeen foundnotonly inarti-
ficial tasks, such as the perception of the relative mass of two colliding balls (Jacobs,
Runeson, & Michaels, 2001) or the perception of the pulling force of a stick figure
(Michaels&deVries,1998),butalso inecologicallynatural tasks. It appears thatan-
imals sometimes exploit nonspecifying variables to perceive or realize affordances
(e.g., Michaels, 2000; Michaels, Zeinstra, & Oudejans, 2001; Solomon & Turvey,
1988; Turvey & Carello, 1995). The perception of the distance reachable with a
hand-held rod via dynamic touch is an instance of such an affordance perception. As
hasbeendemonstratedextensively,peoplehaveadefinite impressionof thedistance
reachable with a hand-held rod when wielding it (e.g., Solomon & Turvey, 1988). A
number of studies revealed that this perception is informed by the rod’s moments of
inertia, the rod’s resistances to angular acceleration (e.g., Solomon & Turvey, 1988;
Turvey & Carello, 1995). A moment of inertia is a function of the rod’s mass distribu-
tion and, therefore, is related ambiguously to the distance reachable with the rod. As
Carello, Fitzpatrick, Domaniewicz, Chan, and Turvey (1992) put it, “Given a mo-
ment of inertia of 41,666.7 g · cm2, one could suppose that the object in question was
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2g/250 cm, or 150g/28.9 cm, or 10g/111.8 cm, or 500g/15.8 cm, and so on” (p. 291).
The same value of the moment of inertia occurs with rods of different lengths, and
equal-length rods can occur with different values of the moment of inertia. Never-
theless, “perceived distance reachable with a rod is a single valued function of mo-
ment of inertia, that is, people feel a given rotational inertia as a single well-defined
extent and not as multiple possible extents” (Carello et al., p. 291). Thus, perceived
distancereachable is specific toan informationalvariable,but theexploited informa-
tional variable is not specific to the actual distance reachable.
What does the demonstration that animals sometimes rely on nonspecifying vari-
ables mean? Does it reject Gibson’s (1966, 1979/1986) direct perception theory? A
number of ecological psychologists have suggested that the pickup of specifying in-
formation is a necessary condition for perception to be direct. Vicente (2003), for in-
stance, stated, “Perception can be direct only if there is a one-to-one relation be-
tween an invariant and an affordance. In other words, the invariant (a higher order
property of the stimulus array) must directly specify the affordance” (p. 249). And
Michaels and Carello (1981) argued that, “The viability of a theory of direct percep-
tion depends on a demonstration that the energy pattern stimulating the senses con-
taina specificationof theenvironment” (p.19).Thus, thedemonstration thatanan-
imal exploits a nonspecifying variable seems inconsistent with the direct perception
theory. Instead, the demonstration seems to provide evidence for the more tradi-
tional indirect perception theory that Gibson (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) opposed.
Broadly speaking, this theory holds that the pickup of stimulus information that is
ambiguouswithrespect to its source implies thatperceptualprocessesare inferential:
Because the stimulus does not specify its source, the perceiver has to infer what
causes the stimulus in order to gain knowledge about the environment. The result of
the inferential processes is a representation of the world, and this representation is
the object of perception. Hence, the animal does not perceive the environment di-
rectly, but indirectly, that is, via a representation. For instance, in Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, Neisser (1967) stated:
We have no direct, immediate access to the world, nor to any of its properties. … What-
ever we know about reality has been mediated, not only by the organs of sense but by
complex systems which interpret and reinterpret sensory information. … [The] pat-
terns of light at the retina are the so-called “proximal stimuli.” … One- sided in their
perspective, shifting radically several timeseachsecond,uniqueandnovel at everymo-
ment, theproximal stimulibear little resemblance toeither the realobject thatgave rise
to them or to the object of experience that the perceiver will construct as a result.
Visual cognition, then, deals with the processes by which a perceived, remem-
bered, and thought-about world is brought into being from as unpromising a begin-
ning as the retinal patterns. (pp. 3–4)
Although this indirect perception theory has been criticized—in particular by
ecological psychologists (e.g., Gibson, 1966, 1979/1986; Michaels & Carello, 1981;
Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982), its premise that the pickup of nonspecifying vari-
PICKUP OF NONSPECIFYING VARIABLES 239
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ables entails a representational conception of perception is hardly ever questioned.
Both indirect-perception theorists and direct-perception theorists appear to con-
sider the premise as beyond dispute (see Michaels & de Vries, 1998, for an excep-
tion). Ecological psychologists generally argue that the environment is directly per-
ceived because animals pick up specifying variables. Hence, the finding that
animals also rely on nonspecifying variables seems to imply that animals sometimes
perceive their environments indirectly, that is, via a representation.
This article addresses the question of whether the pickup of nonspecifying vari-
ables entails a representational conception of perception. The article consists of two
parts. In the first part, it is argued that ecologically motivated studies are likely to re-
veal that animals also pick up informational variables that relate ambiguously to the
to-be-perceived property. Probably not every meaningful environmental property is
specified by an informational variable. Furthermore, from an evolutionary perspec-
tive there is reason to believe that animals also attend to informational variables that
relate ambiguously to environmental properties, even if specifying information
exists. In the second and main part of the article, the question of whether the pickup
of nonspecifying variables entails indirect perception is addressed and answered in
the negative. Gibson’s (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) conception of perception as a direct
epistemiccontactwiththeenvironment isadopted. It is suggestedthat thisepistemic
contact can be thought of as a continuum—the contact with a particular environ-
mentalpropertycandiffer indegree.Thestrengthof thecontact isdeterminedbythe
informational variable exploited. In this framework, the animal is in direct epistemic
contact with a particular environmental property, regardless of whether a specifying
or nonspecifying variable is exploited.
ANIMALS ALSO PICK UP
NONSPECIFYING VARIABLES
There are several reasons why ecologically motivated studies are likely to reveal the
pickup of informational variables that relate ambiguously to the to-be-perceived
property. I will give two.
Probably Not Every Environmental Property Is Specified
by an Informational Variable
Some ecological psychologists (e.g., Jacobs, 2001; Vicente, 2003) have suggested
that probably not every environmental property is specified by an informational
variable. Vicente, for instance, argued that
there are many situations where it seems clear that information, in the Gibsonian
sense, does not exist. An obvious example is the behavior of the stock market. As far
as anyone knows, there are no deterministic rules or laws that govern changes in the
240 WITHAGEN
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
50
 4
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
prices of stocks. This is a prototypical example of the type of situation that cannot be
captured by direct perception. … (p. 260)
And Jacobs (2001) wrote
I hesitate to accept the argument commonly made by ecological psychologists that
relevant environmental properties must be specified by ambient energy patterns
merely because such patterns are generated lawfully. For instance, although not very
likely in natural situations, it is physically possible that different combinations of
forces result in the same net force and thus generate the same movement, which is to
say, despite their lawful generation, movement patterns do not necessarily specify the
underlying forces. Likewise, the mere fact that ambient arrays are a function of envi-
ronmental properties does not prove that such functions always have an inverse.
(p. 199)
As Runeson (1988) argued, specificity is contingent on constraints. That is, it is
by virtue of physical laws and ecological constraints that informational variables
are related one-to-one to environmental properties. Consider, for instance, the
KSD-principle. KSD stands for kinematic specification of dynamics—it entails that
dynamic properties are specified by kinematic patterns (e.g., Runeson, 1995;
Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000). This principle is illustrated by the collision of
balls, showing that the relative mass of the balls is specified by “the relative
amount of motion change incurred by the colliding objects” (Runeson et al., p.
527). This specificity relation between the dynamical property (relative mass)
and the kinematic pattern (changes in velocity) exists because of the conserva-
tion of momentum, rendering the momentum before collision equal to the mo-
mentum after collision. This physical law grants the relative amount of motion
change to be specific to the relative mass of the balls.
The fact that the specificity relation between informational variables and envi-
ronmental properties is contingent on physical laws and ecological constraints
means that it might be that not every meaningful environmental property is related
uniquely to an informational variable. As Turvey and Carello (1995) put it, “Struc-
tured arrays can only be as specific to their sources as the laws of physics allow” (p.
483). Hence, given the physical laws and ecological constraints in the animal’s nat-
ural habitat, certain meaningful environmental properties might not be specified
by informational variables. This would mean that animals have no option but to
pick up nonspecifying variables to perceive those properties.
Evolution Does Not Yield Animals That Rely Exclusively
on Specifying Information
But if specifying information is present in the ambient arrays, then will the ani-
mal pick it up? From an evolutionary perspective there is reason to believe that
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animals also attend to nonspecifying variables, even if specifying information
exists. First, it might be that particular specifying information is not exploited be-
cause the system that is required for its pickup could not evolve. As has been ar-
gued extensively over the last 40 years by many evolutionary biologists (e.g., An-
drews, Gangestad, & Matthews, in press; Cartwright, 2000; Clark, 1989;
Dawkins, 1982; Gould, 1997; Gould & Lewontin, 1978; Jacob, 1977; Kauffman,
1995; Sober, 1993), and appreciated by some ecological psychologists (e.g.,
Johnston & Turvey, 1980; Reed, 1996), evolution by natural selection does not
work as an optimizing agent, yielding optimally designed systems that are per-
fectly adapted to their environments.1 Organic form and behavior are the result
not only of natural selection but also of numerous developmental, phyletic, and
historical constraints that influence the path of evolution to a considerable de-
gree. Animals are integrated wholes, Gould and Lewontin (1978) asserted, “with
Baupläne so constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development, and gen-
eral architecture that the constraints themselves become more interesting and
more important in delimiting pathways of change than the selective force that
may mediate change when it occurs” (p. 581). The constraints can restrict paths
and modes of change in such a way that certain systems are unlikely to evolve
(see, e.g., Dawkins, 1982). Hence, it might be that particular specifying informa-
tion is not picked up because the constraints restrict the evolutionary processes
in such a way that the system required for the detection of this specifying infor-
mation, the so-called smart perceptual device (Runeson, 1977), could not
evolve.
Second, natural selection is not so powerful that animals that also pick up
nonspecifying variables cannot survive. Nonspecifying variables are not necessar-
ily useless variables—their pickup does not necessarily yield perception that is
fundamentally in error. A nonspecifying variable can be quite informative about
an environmental property. Again, consider the relation between the rod’s
length and its moment of inertia around one of its ends. The moment of inertia
is determined by how far the rod’s constituent masses are from its end—that is, it
is partly determined by the rod’s linear dimensions. This means that the rod’s
moment of inertia is “informative about its linear dimensions, but not perfectly
so” (Turvey & Carello, 1995, p. 483). Hence, an animal that picks up this vari-
able can have a fairly accurate perception of the distance reachable with the
hand-held rod. Granted, the pickup of this nonspecifying information yields cer-
tain errors—rods that are of different lengths are sometimes perceived as being
of the same length, and equal-length rods are sometimes perceived as being of
242 WITHAGEN
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that information exists and that some sort of optimal information is available to the organism” (p. 48).
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different lengths, but its detection does not necessarily result in perception that
is fundamentally in error (cf. Carello et al., 1992).
Evolution is likely to yield animals that also pick up such nonspecifying, mod-
erately informative variables. In the course of evolution, animals with perception
and action accurate enough to survive and reproduce were selected. In many
cases this means that a considerable degree of perceptual inaccuracy is allowed.
For instance, a human being who intercepts 70% of the balls thrown at him or
her because he or she exploits a nonspecifying, moderately informative variable
will not die because of that. The selection pressures are not that strong that an
animal that also picks up nonspecifying but useful variables cannot survive.
Relatedly, natural selection is in many cases relative: The animals that survive
are the ones that do better than their competitors. This does not, however, imply
that the animal that survives exploits the specifying variable; rather, it implies, at
least if the accuracy of perception was the determining factor for survival, that
the animal picks up a more useful variable than its competitor, but this might be
a nonspecifying variable. In sum, there is reason to believe that animals exploit
specifying as well as nonspecifying variables. Hence, ecologically motivated stud-
ies are likely to reveal that animals also pick up informational variables that re-
late ambiguously to the to-be-perceived property.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT PERCEPTION?
As touched on in the introduction, the finding that animals pick up non-
specifying variables raises the question of whether perception of the environment
is always direct. It seems to imply that animals perceive their environments indi-
rectly, that is, via a representation. Recently, Runeson et al. (2000) argued that
the pickup of nonspecifying variables indeed implies that the environment is not
directly perceived. They studied the process of how people learn to visually per-
ceive the relative mass of two colliding balls. As Gibson (1966) asserted, the pro-
cess of perceptual learning is a process of differentiation: The animal discovers
the to-be-attended-to pattern in the ambient array or arrays. That is, the animal
learns to exploit the informational variable that is specific to the to-be-perceived
property. Gibson (1966) referred to this process as the education of attention.2 In
their study, Runeson et al. found evidence for this process. Many participants
initially relied on a nonspecifying variable and converged on the specifying vari-
able after feedback.
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2Recently, Jacobs and Michaels (2002) argued that because this process of convergence on the spec-
ifying variable is a short-term process, animals pick up only specifying variables in the long term. How-
ever, if the previously mentioned evolutionary arguments are right, it is unlikely that the process of con-
vergence always results in the pickup of specifying variables, especially on the short timescale that
Jacobs and Michaels suggested.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
50
 4
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
However, Runeson et al. (2000) argued that during this process a transition
from an indirect to a direct mode of apprehension takes place. If the perceiver picks
up a nonspecifying variable (as at the start of the learning process), he or she is in
the indirect mode; that is, the perceiver is in a mode of apprehension in which the
nonspecifying variable is enriched through inferential processes. If, on the other
hand, a specifying variable is exploited (as at the end of the learning process), the
environment is directly perceived. This theory of mode transition follows if the na-
ture of the informational variable exploited is taken to be the distinguishing feature
of the two perception theories: The theory of indirect perception holds that
nonspecifying perceptual variables are exploited; the theory of direct perception
states that specifying variables are picked up.
It is, however, questionable whether the nature of the perceptual variables ex-
ploited is the quintessence of direct perception. A more central tenet of the direct
perception theory, I think, is the claim on the object of perception (see also Heft,
2001; Mace, 2002). As is described in more detail in the next section, Gibson’s
(1966, 1979/1986) ecological psychology is rooted in the realist approach to per-
ception (see, e.g., Heft, 2001; Lombardo, 1987; Reed, 1988). This approach states
that the environment is the object of perception. Perception is conceived of as a di-
rect epistemic contact with the environment.
By asserting that the environment is perceived, Gibson (1959, 1966,
1979/1986) rejected a central tenet of the indirect perception theory, namely
that a mental representation of the environment is the perceived object.
Stemming from the Cartesian tradition, the indirect perception theory treats per-
ception as a subjective mental state, more or less isolated from the environment
(e.g., see Fodor, 1980). The basic idea is as follows: A stimulus impinges on a
sense organ and gives rise to a sensation, an awareness of the state of the recep-
tors. Only this sensation is directly apprehended. Because the sensation is ambig-
uous with respect to its source, the animal must deduce what causes the sensa-
tion in order to gain knowledge about the environment. The inferential
processes result in a representation of the environment, and this representation
is perceived. Thus, the animal does not perceive the environment, but a repre-
sentation of it. In this framework, perception resides in the animal and is more or
less detached from the environment. Although in different forms, this idea domi-
nated perception theories from Descartes to Müller and Helmholtz and is the ba-
sic assumption in many recent cognitive theories of perception (e.g., see
Meijering, 1989; Reed, 1982).
The representational conception of perception runs the risk of introducing a
homunculus, a little person inside the head that looks at the mental representa-
tion. Thereby, the indirect perception theory would take a “loan of intelligence”
(Dennett, 1978) and lead to an infinite regress (who perceives the mental repre-
sentation of the homunculus …) (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Shaw et al., 1982). How-
ever, it is not clear that the pickup of nonspecifying variables logically implies a rep-
resentational conception of perception. In the remainder of the article this thesis is
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addressed and rejected. It is suggested that animals are in direct epistemic contact
with their environments, regardless of whether a specifying or nonspecifying vari-
able is picked up.
Perception as an Epistemic Relation With
the Environment
Although highly revolutionary, Gibson’s (1966, 1979/1986) ecological approach did
not come out of nowhere. It is, as stated earlier, rooted in the realist tradition of per-
ception that can be traced back to Aristotle (see Lombardo, 1987). The realist ap-
proach of Gibson was influenced most directly by that of Edwin B. Holt, his graduate
school mentor at Princeton and a former student of William James (Heft, 2001).3
Holt’s approach attempted to circumvent the problems of psychologies based on the
Cartesian dualisms of mind and matter, and animal and environment. It holds that
mentalphenomenadonot reside in theanimal, but in thedynamic relationof thean-
imal and its environment. As Holt (1914/1973) pointed out, “consciousness or mind
is not inside the skull nor secreted anywhere within the nervous system; but all the
objects that one perceives, including the so-called ‘secondary qualities,’ are ‘out
there’ just where and as they seem to be” (p. 181). But how can the environment be
the object of perception? In his essays on cognition and response, Holt (1915a,
1915b) paid considerable attention to conceptualizing behavior. He argued that
The behaving organism, whether plant, fellow man, or one’s own self, is always doing
something, and the fairly accurate description of this activity will invariably reveal a
law (or laws) whereby this activity is shown to be a constant function of some aspect
of the objective world. (1915a, p. 370)
The collection of these aspects form what Holt called a “cross-section,” a concept
that refers to a part of a manifold that is defined by a law unrelated to this manifold.
Holt (1914/1973) illustrated this concept as follows:
A navigator exploring his course at night with the help of a searchlight, illuminates a
considerable expanse of wave and cloud, occasionally the bow and forward mast of
his ship, and the hither side of other ships and buoys, lighthouses, and other objects
that lie above the horizon. Now the sum total of all surfaces thus illuminated in the
course, say, of an entire night is a cross-section of the region in question that has
rather interesting characteristics. It is defined, of course, by the contours and surface
composition of the region, including such changes as take place in these (specially on
PICKUP OF NONSPECIFYING VARIABLES 245
3In the beginning of his career, Gibson was a proponent of Holt’s motor theory of consciousness and
conducted some experiments to test the theory (e.g., Gibson & Hudson, 1935; Gibson, Jack, & Raffel,
1932). By the 1960s Gibson had rejected this theory but retained Holt’s idea of perception as an
epistemic relation between the animal and its environment (see Reed, 1988).
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the surface of the waves) and by the searchlight and its movement, and by the prog-
ress of the ship. (p. 171)
The cross-section is relational: It is determined by the ship relative to the envi-
ronment, namely the part of the environment through which the ship is passing.
In like fashion, the animal’s environment constitutes a cross-section. “It is to
certain features, and not to others, of its environment that the living organism
responds, and the group of things to which it thus reacts constitutes a cross-sec-
tion manifold … ” (Holt, 1914/1973, p. 172). The collection of environmental
objects that form the cross-section is defined by the animal’s sensitivity, but exist
independent of it; the objects are aspects of the objective world. Holt stated that
these objects are perceived. “I know not what distinction can be drawn between
the object of consciousness and the object of behavior” (Holt, 1915b, pp.
393–394). In other words, the environment is the object of perception: “This
neutral cross-section as defined by the specific reaction of reflex-arcs is the psy-
chic realm:—it is the manifold of our sensations, perception and ideas:—it is
consciousness” (Holt, 1914/1973, p. 182).
In this framework, perception does not reside in the animal; it is not localized in
the brain or some other piece of anatomy.4 Instead, perception is conceived of as a
relation between the animal and its environment—it is an ecological phenome-
non. Just as reading a book is a relation between the reader and the book, percep-
tion is a relation between the perceiver and the perceived. More precisely, percep-
tion is an epistemic relation between the animal and its environment—a being in
contact with the environment, which is achieved by the pickup of perceptual infor-
mation (e.g., Heft, 2001; Holt, 1914/1973; Lombardo, 1987; Shaw et al., 1982).
Epistemic Contact With the Environment as a Continuum
Gibson (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) adopted the previously mentioned conception
of perception. In his essay Perception as a Function of Stimulation, he started by
stating, “The word perception in this essay means the process by which an individ-
ual maintains contact with his environment” (1959, p. 457). Gibson (1959,
1966, 1979/1986) aimed at explaining how this epistemic relation of the animal
with its environment—in his terminology the keeping-in-touch with the world—is
established, and he introduced the concept of information as specification. Gibson
(1959) argued that the pickup of an informational variable that specifies an envi-
ronmental property is a necessary condition for being in epistemic contact with
that property. There is, Gibson (1959) asserted, a one-to-one relation between
an environmental property and a pattern in the ambient array, and between this
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4This is not to say that the brain is not of importance in perception. In this conceptualization, the
brain is conceived as an organ that provides the causal support for establishing an epistemic relation be-
tween the animal and its environment. As Lombardo (1987) stated, “Animals perceive with their per-
ceptual systems; it is not the perceptual systems that perceive” (p. 330).
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pattern and the perception (cf. Turvey, 1990). To be in touch with an environ-
mental property, Gibson (1959) argued, this chain should remain unbroken.
“There is no other avenue for contact with or knowledge of the environment” (Gibson,
1959, p. 464).
In these statements about the keeping-in-touch with an environmental prop-
erty, the epistemic contact is thought of as all or nothing: The animal is in direct
touch with a certain environmental property if and only if it picks up an informa-
tional variable that is specific to that property. But is the epistemic contact with an
environmental property all or nothing? Is the keeping-in-touch with an environ-
mental property achieved if and only if a specifying variable is picked up, and not if
a nonspecifying but moderately informative variable is exploited? It might be more
constructive to think of the keeping-in-touch with the environment as a contin-
uum—the epistemic contact with an environmental property can differ in degree.
That is, an animal that picks up a nonspecifying variable is not deprived of direct
epistemic contact with an environmental property, perceiving that property via a
representation. Rather, that animal’s epistemic contact with the environmental
property is not as strong as that of an animal that exploits a specifying variable.
Consider, for instance, a dynamic touch experiment in which participants are to
position a planar surface at the distance reachable with a hand-held, unseen rod.5
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that a participant picks up an informa-
tional variable that is specific to the distance reachable. Such a participant is in
perfect touch with the distance reachable—any change in the length of the
hand-held rod is reflected by a change in the position of the planar surface. A
weaker epistemic touch with the distance reachable is established if the participant
picks up a nonspecifying, moderately informative variable, such as moment of iner-
tia. Being not in perfect touch with the distance reachable, that participant’s posi-
tioning of the planar surface is not as firmly tied to the lengths of the rods.
Equal-length rods can occur with different positions of the surface, and rods of dif-
ferent lengths can occur with the same position of the surface. The epistemic con-
tact with the distance reachable with the hand-held rod is weaker and, thus, the re-
sponse-panel position less accurate, if the exploited informational variable is less
informative about the distance reachable.6
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5One might argue that this artificial experimental setup is not representative of the natural situa-
tion, for the participant is deprived of visual information about the length of the hand-held rod. How-
ever, this example is used just to illustrate the idea of a continuum of contact.
6Note that this idea of a continuum of contact refers to the epistemic contact with an environmen-
tal property. The idea is not related to the ecological conception of nesting and the allied concept of dif-
ferentiation. Mace (2002) illustrated these concepts as follows: “A real world is distinct from a surrogate
world by virtue of its nested structure at all scales. When one looks closely at the skin of a person, one ul-
timately gets to cells. When one gets closer to the painting of a face, one gets to the paint and grain of
canvas, not cells and skin tissue” (p. 111). The continuum idea that I present in this article does not re-
late to this process by which an animal gets in touch with more properties or details of an environmental
object. Rather, the continuum idea refers to the epistemic touch with an environmental property, say, a
particular affordance.
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In this conceptualization, the difference between an animal that exploits a spec-
ifying variable and an animal that picks up a nonspecifying variable is not the dif-
ference between directly and indirectly perceiving an affordance; rather, the ani-
mals differ in the strength of the epistemic contact with the affordance, the animal
picking up the specifying variable being in better touch with the affordance than
the animal that attends to the nonspecifying variable. In other words, the idea of a
continuum of contact entails that an animal is in direct epistemic contact with a
particular affordance, regardless of whether a specifying or nonspecifying variable
is exploited.
What are the implications of this continuum idea for the ecological approach to
perception?
First, the continuum idea recognizes the pickup of nonspecifying variables and
preserves the realist conception of perception. It holds that the animal is in direct
epistemic contact with its environment also when a nonspecifying variable is
picked up. Hence, the idea is consonant with the sine qua non of the realist ap-
proach to perception in which Gibson’s (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) psychology is
rooted: Perception is an epistemic relation between the animal and its environ-
ment.
Second, the continuum idea provides a way of conceptualizing perceptual
learning. As stated earlier, Gibson (1966) conceived of perceptual learning as a
process by which the animal learns to discover the informational variable that is
specific to the to-be-perceived affordance. According to the continuum idea, the
process by which animals converge on the variable yields a better epistemic contact
with an environmental property. Thus, if animals converge on the specifying vari-
ables to perceive or realize the affordances—either at the timescale of phylogeny,
ontogeny, or learning—the strength of the epistemic contact with these
affordances increases.
Third, the continuum idea provides a way of conceptualizing perceptual mis-
takes. Despite Gibson’s (1966) elucidation of misperceptions (see also Michaels
& Carello, 1981; Shaw et al., 1982), an often-heard critique of his direct percep-
tion theory is that it cannot account for perceptual errors. In cognitive theory,
these errors are generally conceptualized as errors of correspondence between
the perception and the actual environmental state of affairs. A theory of direct
perception cannot accept such a conceptualization (Heft, 2001; Shaw et al.,
1982; see also Holt, 1914/1973). After all, this conceptualization is based on an
animal–environmental dualism: The perception resides inside the animal and
does or does not correspond to the environmental state outside. The definition
of perception as an epistemic relation between the animal and its environment
abandons this dualism. As an alternative conceptualization, some ecological psy-
chologists, following Holt, conceived of perceptual errors as “a lack of coherence
or consistency within perceptual experience” (Heft, 2001, p. 80; see also Shaw et
al., 1982, on “possible-worlds semantics”). That is, the perceptual experiences of
the same object might differ under different conditions. To use an example of
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Holt (see Heft, 2001), a stick appears bent when viewed in water but not when
viewed out of water. The perceptual error, it is argued, does not consist in an er-
ror of correspondence between the appearance and the reality, but in the lack of
consistency between appearances under different viewing conditions (see Heft,
2001). The continuum idea provides an alternative to this ecological conceptu-
alization: If keeping-in-touch with the environment is a continuum, perceptual
errors can be conceived as a weak epistemic contact between the animal and an
environmental property; that is, the animal is not in full epistemic contact with
the property.
Fourth, a prerequisite of the continuum idea is that an animal can be in
epistemic contact with an environmental property by attending to an informa-
tional variable that does not specify that property. This conflicts with a thesis
defended by some ecological psychologists. As stated earlier, Gibson (1959), for
instance, argued that an animal can establish an epistemic contact with an envi-
ronmental property only through the pickup of an informational variable that is
specific to that property. “There is no other avenue for contact with or knowledge of
the environment” (Gibson, 1959, p. 464). However, this thesis is inconsistent with
some experimental findings. Again, consider the perception of the distance
reachable with a hand-held rod via dynamic touch. As stated earlier, humans
have a definite impression of the distance reachable, but the informational vari-
able that informs their perception does not specify it (e.g., Solomon & Turvey,
1988; Turvey & Carello, 1995; Withagen & Michaels, 2001). Thus, it seems that
the prerequisite for the continuum idea is met: An epistemic relation with an en-
vironmental property can be established by picking up an informational variable
that does not relate one-to-one to that property.
Fifth, the continuum idea requires a new definition of information. In ecological
theory, the concept of information refers to the one-to-one relation between a pat-
tern in the ambient array or arrays and a to-be-perceived environmental property
(see, e.g., Michaels, 2000; Vicente, 2003).
[T]he invariant (a higher order property of the stimulus array) must directly specify
the affordance (a goal-relevant distal property of the environment). This one-to-one
mapping is referred to as information, a theoretical construct that has a unique and
important meaning in Gibsonian ecological psychology that differs from the normal
usage of the term. (Vicente, pp. 249–250)
However, the continuum idea implies that animals are sometimes informed
about an environmental property by variables that do not specify it. That is, ani-
mals are informed by variables that are not qualified as information according to
the previously mentioned ecological conception. Thus, as Chemero (2003)
recently argued, it seems that ecological psychology is in need of a new concept of
information. What is called for is a conception that does not require a one-to-one
relation between a pattern in the ambient array and an environmental property.
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In the philosophy of information, such a conception has been (recently) devel-
oped. Millikan (2000), for instance, introduced the concept of informationC,
where C stands for correlation.
Natural signs bearing informationC are, as such, instances of types that are correlated
with what they sign, there being a reason, grounded in natural necessity, why this cor-
relation extends through a period of time or from one part of a locale to another.
(p. 237)
However, the correlation, Millikan (2000) argued, can be weak.
For example, a particular instance of a small shadow moving across the ground is a
natural sign carrying informationC that a flying predator is overhead if it is actually
caused by a flying predator, but the correlation that supports this natural signing,
though it persists for good reason, may not be particularly strong. (Millikan, p. 237)
In the prey’s natural habitat there is no one-to-one relation between the
shadow and the flying predator overhead. On a cloudy day, the flying predator does
not yield a shadow moving across the ground—thus, no shadow does not necessar-
ily imply no predator. And a nonpredator of the same shape as the predator could
have produced the same shadow—thus, a shadow does not necessarily imply a
predator. Therefore, the shadow is informative about a flying predator overhead,
but not perfectly so. The Gibsonian ecological approach is in need of a conception
of information that captures this information bearing of such nonspecifying
variables.
CONCLUSION
In this article it was argued that ecologically motivated studies are likely to reveal the
pickup of information variables that relate ambiguously to the to-be-perceived prop-
erty. Probably not every environmental property is specified by an informational
variable. Furthermore, from an evolutionary perspective there is reason to believe
that animals also attend to informational variables that relate ambiguously to envi-
ronmental properties, even if specifying information exists. This raises the question
of whether animals also perceive indirectly. I have argued that the pickup of
nonspecifying variables does not entail a representational conception of perception.
I adopted Gibson’s (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) conception of perception as a direct
epistemic contact with the environment and suggested that this “keeping-in-touch
with the world” (Gibson, 1979/1986) can be thought of as a continuum—the
epistemic contact of the animal with an affordance can differ in degree. The strength
of thiscontact isdeterminedby the informationalvariableexploited. If the specifying
variable is picked up, the animal is in full contact with the affordance; the contact is
weaker if the informational variable exploited is less informative. In this framework,
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the animal is in direct epistemic contact with an affordance, regardless of whether a
specifying or nonspecifying variable is exploited.
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